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Abstract
U.K. company insiders, such as directors, were legally allowed to trade in the shares
of their own companies up until the Companies Act of 1980. We investigate the trading
behaviour of directors over the period 1893 to 1907 in the U.K. Although insider
trading was profitable, we find relatively few instances of directors who exploited their
informational advantage.
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Turn of the 20th century Britain was a period of practically unfettered capitalism for
company insiders. The threat of a hostile takeover was not present until after the Second
World War (see Hannah (1974)) and directors’elections were staggered, with only 1/3 up
for election in each year and directors could not be dismissed by an ordinary resolution (i.e.
50% + 1 votes were insuffi cient to remove a director) at the annual general meetings (AGM)
pre-1948 (see Cheffi ns (2008) p. 129 and also Campbell and Turner (2011)). In addition,
directors were legally entitled to enter into contracts with their own firms, could side-step
stock exchange rules on issuing prospectuses, and could omit to publicly file any financial
statements pre-1908 (and anything meaningful after 1908). On top of this, directors could
deal in the stock of their own firms, with insider trading rules only coming into force in the
Companies Act of 1980, which prohibited persons to trade in securities in which they had
‘unpublished price sensitive information.’
Within such a corporate setting directors had great leeway to enrich themselves at the
expense of shareholders, which is the standard agency problem. Although there were bound
to have been virtually limitless ways in which a director could take advantage of such a
situation two simple methods stand out. Firstly, a director could contract to (personally)
supply the company with goods at an inflated price. Secondly, as directors possessed inside
(private) information on the state of the company’s affairs, they could buy(sell) shares be-
fore the public release of good(bad) information. Most companies’Articles of Association
required directors to hold a minimum number of shares in the firm, although this was not
a legal requirement (see Campbell and Turner(2011)). We find that the vast majority of
directors held shares in their own firms, frequently many of them. The passage of legislation
forcing directors to reveal (but not precluding their vote on) their personal dealings with the
company only arrived with the Companies Act of 1929.1 The eventual passage of legisla-
tion forbidding insider trading in 1980, and the first prosecution in 1981 (see Bhattacharya
and Daouk (2002)), indicates that some directors were also at risk of using their private
information for personal gain.
The lack of transparency, and absence of many binding rules, was more than a theoretical
1Although the London Stock Exchange are on record as forcing listed companies to have stricter rules in
their Articles of Association from 1902 onwards (see Cheffi ns(2008) p. 76)
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concern. Cheffi ns (2008) p. 124 reports Van Oss’claim in 1899 that: “shareholders seldom
assert their will. They are led and easily led...the rule that shareholders do as they are
bidden by their servants (the directors) has very few exceptions." Henry Lowenfeld asserted
that: “directors who are prepared whole-heartedly to devote themselves to their sharehold-
ers’ interests are the exception."2 General apathy (which can perhaps be more charitably
termed “passive investment") seems to have been the main reason for the strong position
of incumbent directors. Kennedy (1987) p. 126 concludes that as a result: “the company’s
directors (are) in (a) virtually unchallengeable and unchecked possession of the company’s
assets’." Hannah (2007) says that Edwin Phillips (writing in 1877): “bemoaned the inability
of British shareholders to control ‘self-elective despots’, that is, railway company managers."
Modern studies (e.g., Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012), Friederich, Gregory, Matatko,
and Tonks (2002), and Ravina and Sapienza (2009)) show that some company insiders do,
in fact, take advantage of private information for themselves, despite legal strictures against
such behaviour. Cohen et al find that directors who trade in a ‘routine’fashion (e.g., in the
same month every year) convey no information by their trades, whereas ‘opportunistic’trad-
ing conveys much information. Due to the absence of insider trading rules in the Victorian
and Edwardian eras, there is no trading by directors in the same month of every year, and
all of our directors’trades would be considered ‘opportunistic’by Cohen et al’s definition.
Friederich et al find that U.K. company insiders have the ability to forecast short-run returns
(they buy before a price run-up and sell before a price drop). However, bid-ask spreads mean
that outsiders who try to mimic directors’trades can not profit by doing so. Ravina and
Sapienza (2009) show that company executives and independent directors earn abnormal
returns by dealing in their own firm’s stock. Most of these abnormal returns come from the
trades of firms with poor corporate governance. With an absence of legal, or stock exchange,
rules in Victorian Britain to constrain insider trading, one may expect very high abnormal
returns due to insider trading in our sample.
In a setting with no regulations forbidding insider trading, one may expect a prevalence of
unethical behaviour. Cheffi ns (2008) p. 173 says that: “assuming the vendors retained shares
2Quoted by Cheffi ns on p. 125
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... it was reasonable for shareholders to rely on the strong financial and personal interest
the directors would have in the success of the company." If the directors were seen to have
sold out their holdings, shareholders may have inferred that trouble was ahead. However,
individuals had to physically consult the shareholder register to obtain such information and
Cheffi ns (2008) p. 172 states that: “such inspections were unlikely to be feasible for anyone
living any distance from a company’s registered offi ce." We find that although insider trading
benefited the insiders, in the sense that some directors sold their own shares before periods
of poor performance, these means to personally enrich themselves were fairly infrequently
used. For example, during the 60 days prior to a report of a drop in earnings only 20% of all
directors’sales took place. Having 20% of directors’trades clustered in this narrowly defined
time frame is much higher than would be expected by chance. However, the clear majority
of directors’trades took place outside these periods in which they had major incentives to
sell before the drop in profitability was reported. It is likely that social norms of behaviour
constrained directors from maximizing the financial returns from their positions.
In Section I we describe the role of directors in the U.K. and in Section II we present our
data. Section III shows our results and we conclude in Section IV.
I The role of Directors
British firms were allowed to incorporate freely after the passage of the Joint Stock Com-
panies Act 1844, which was followed with the introduction of limited liability in 1855. The
Companies Act of 1862 had very little to say about the role of directors; the names of di-
rectors had to be available for inspection at a firm’s offi ce and sent to the Registrar of Joint
Stock Companies (s. 44). Directors were only liable if they had stolen money from the com-
pany or: “been guilty of any Misfeasance or Breach of Trust" (s. 164). Directors had even
been exonerated when they were found to have lied in a prospectus (see Derry v Peek(1889))
and bankrupts were allowed to serve as directors. The lack of oversight of directors remained
an issue for decades, with the Company Law Amendment Committee 1925-26 complaining
that it was common for Articles of Association to: “exempt directors in every case except
4
that of actual dishonesty." The same committee also complained about the non-disclosure
of directors’remuneration and loans from the company to directors.
Company Law changed little from 1862 until 1900. An 1894 Board of Trade report
that recommended that directors be required to exercise “reasonable care and prudence"
was ignored by Parliament (see Cheffi ns (2008) p. 195). There was no requirement that a
firm’s financial statements were audited before 1900 and firms were able to conceal contracts
between a director and the company up until 1929 (see Cheffi ns (2008) p. 76).
The London Stock Exchange issued their own directives, but of course these only covered
firms who chose to offi cially list in London. A firm could be unlisted but trade under ‘special
settlement’(see Cheffi ns (2008) p. 196) if further regulation was undesired by the directors.
Offi cially listed companies were required to limit directors’borrowing power by 1895. In
1902 the stock exchange forced listed firms to require their directors to own a minimum
number of shares, circulate a balance sheet to shareholders, and not vote on any contract of
the company in which he had a personal interest. The Company Law Amendment Act, 1907
extended the requirement to publicly file a balance sheet to all firms (see Cheffi ns (2008) p.
194).
The power of incumbent directors was enhanced by the judicious use of proxy voting and
special voting rights. Proxy voting was only allowed if a company’s Articles of Association
expressly allowed it. If permitted, directors often took advantage by mailing proxy forms
to all shareholders before the AGM and naming themselves (or associates) as the proxies.3
Although voting rights were freely chosen by a firm in its articles of association, Hannah
(2007) demonstrates that several firms in railways, gas, and shipping followed the suggestions
of the Companies Act, 1862 (Schedule A) in using “capped" voting rights. This act suggested
one vote per share up to 10 shares held, then one vote per five shares from 10 to 100 shares,
and then 1 vote per 10 shares held, for amounts beyond 100, although many types of “capped"
voting systems emerged. Hannah (2007) p. 409 and Cheffi ns (2008) p. 32 both suggest that
“capped" voting protected incumbent directors by preventing an outsider who buys up a
large fraction of a firm’s equity from acquiring a large fraction of the voting power of the
3See Cheffi ns(2008) p. 130
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firm. On the other hand, Campbell and Turner (2011) find that only 30% of companies
incorporated after the Companies Act of 1862 used “capped" voting rules.
In short, directors enjoyed exceedingly strong job security, almost completely free from
challenges to their authority. Insider trading was legal, and we have found no documentary
evidence that it was even considered unethical.
II Data
The primary data for this paper come from Form E, Summary of Capital and Shares. These
shareholder lists were obtained from The National Archives. The lists report the name,
address, and occupation of the shareholder, the number of shares held at the end of the year,
and details of any shares sold (but not bought) during the year. Firms were legally obliged to
publish such lists by the 14th day after the company’s AGM (Companies Act of 1862, s. 25).
In addition, a firm was required to make an inspection of such lists available to shareholders
free of charge, and to the general public for the payment of a shilling (Companies Act of
1862, s. 31). Failure to do so meant that the company was liable for a fine of up to £ 5
per day (Companies Act of 1862, s. 26). A company was allowed to close the register for
inspection for up to 30 days per year, but the rest of the year the register had to be available
for inspection for at least 2 hours per day.
All firms were required to annually file shareholder lists with the Registrar of Compa-
nies (now Companies House). Lists of defunct companies are now located in The National
Archives. For space reasons in 1950 The National Archives trimmed their collections by
throwing away records for some firms, and many years of records for the firms that it has
retained.4
We obtain balance sheets and, where available, profit and loss statements for the firms in
our sample from the Guildhall Library in London. Accounting data for electrical, telegraph,
and telephone firms comes from Garcke’s Manual of Electricity Undertakings. We use weekly
data on security prices from the Stock Exchange Daily Offi cial List (SEDOL), also available
4www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=1502CATLN=3FullDetails=True
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at the Guildhall Library, between 1893 and 1907. The SEDOL contains bid and ask quotes,
transaction prices (if any), issued capital, and the ex-dividend day for all securities offi cially
listed on the London Stock Exchange. We calculate the price of a security as the midpoint
of the bid and ask quotes.
We construct a value-weighted market index for London that contains 163 securities.
The market index is composed of seven banks, 33 railways, 7 breweries, 63 commercial and
industrial firms, 19 coal and iron firms, 12 telegraph firms, 20 gas and electric firms, and
two mines. By value the banks comprise around 7% of the index, railways 58%, breweries
7%, commercial and industrial firms 8%, coal and iron firms 4%, telegraph firms 3%, gas
and electric firms 5%, and mines 4%. The average value of the equities included in our
market index (where the average is calculated from 1895 through 1905 is £ 548 million. By
value this is a little over 60% of the London market, so we are confident our market index is
representative.5
Our sample consists of 158 firms for which we can locate shareholder lists between 1890
and 1909. Of these 158 firms, 40 were listed on the London Stock Exchange whereas 118
were unlisted but traded informally on a ‘supplementary list’(see Franks, Mayer, and Rossi
(2009)). We have 94 firm-years of listed firms (since we often observe lists for the same firm
in different years) and 265 firm-years of unlisted firms.
Descriptive statistics for the companies and directors in our data set are provided in
Table I. Firms which were offi cially listed in London (panel A) earned mean profits of 47.5
thousand pounds per year, with mean return on assets (ROA) of 6.2% and a mean return on
equity (ROE) of 10.5%. Profits were growing, on average, by 5.8% per year, although there
was a lot of variation around the mean. ROA and ROE were falling, on average, by 1.5 and
1.1 percentage points per year, again with much variation around the mean. Directors, in
total, held roughly 14% of the equity of the firm (aggregating both ordinary and preference
shares) and the average firm had about four and a half directors. The mean firm had assets of
slightly over one million pounds, was 11 years old (defined as years since last incorporation).
In an average year directors sold 2.1% of the firm’s equity, and a firm’s directors made 2.65
5The value of the entire London equity market is given as £ 887 (see Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2002)).
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individual sales of shares (both ordinary and preference). Listed firms held a reasonable
amount of highly liquid assets, with cash comprising 12%.
Unlisted firms were much smaller (mean profits of 10.5 thousand pounds, mean assets
of 218 thousands pounds) and slightly less profitable, with average ROA of 5.3% and ROE
of 8.5%. Unlisted firms were more closely held by insiders, with directors holding 31.9% of
the equity of these firms, and a bit younger, with an average age of 9 and a half years. The
mean size of the board of directors was almost identical, at 4.6, to the listed firms. There
was less trading by insiders, with directors selling 1.6% of the equity on average, and making
one trade per year. Unlisted firms, perhaps since they were younger with more investment
opportunities, held less cash, just 5.3% of assets.
In panels C and D our unit of observation is a director-year. We find that a little less
than 13% of listed firms (and a little more than 14% of unlisted firms) had directors who
shared the same surname as a word in the company’s name (e.g., Hon. George H. Allsopp
was a director of Samuel Allsopp and Sons). The average listed(unlisted) firm director held
2.6%(7.0%) of the firm’s equity. The average sales (as a percentage of shares held by a
director at the start of the year) were 13.6% for listed firms and 1.0% for unlisted firms.
However, if we calculate the shares sold by a director, as a percentage of the total number
of issued shares of the firm, then these figures are very close, 0.3% for listed firms vs. 0.2%
for unlisted firms.
III Results
To assess if directors were using insider information we check if there was a relationship
between a director’s sales (since purchase dates were not usually recorded) and the financial
performance of the firm. If a director was exploiting inside information he would be tempted
to sell some of his shares before the public release of ‘bad news’, such as a decrease in profits
or the passing of the dividend.
Firms which were offi cially listed on the London Stock Exchange were usually larger
and more newsworthy than unlisted firms. As such, for these listed firms we collect the
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announcement dates of dividends from The Times of London. Firms usually paid dividends
twice per year, with the announcement of the final dividend coinciding with the release of the
firm’s profits for the year. These dividend/earnings announcements are fairly unambiguous
occasions of the release of good/bad information for the firm. We investigate the influences
on directors to sell their shares, and we focus on the 60 day period prior to the release of the
annual profit/dividend figures. The choice of 60 days is made to line up with contemporary
U.K. legislation, which prevents trades by directors in the: “2 months preceding a pre-
liminary, final, or interim earnings announcement”(see Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog
(2006). Therefore, we regress directors’sales in the 60 days prior to the announcement in
year t on the percentage change in profits/return on equity(ROE) from year t-1 to year t
after allowing for several controls (see Table II).
We find that firms whose profitability was (subsequently) reported to have fallen tended
to have more sales of shares by directors in the 60 days before the announcement was made
public. This result holds across a broad range of specifications, and does not depend on
whether or not we define profitability as profits in pounds or as ROE (or as ROA, not
reported). Adding firm fixed effects reduces the measured effect of a decrease in profits
(but not ROE), possibly because firms ‘smoothed’profits via the use of ‘secret reserves’(see
Arnold (1995) and Capie and Billings (2001)). Smoothed profits means that there is little
variation in a firm’s profits through time, which makes identification of a within-firm effect
imprecise. Overall, we find prima facie evidence of insider trading, although it could perhaps
be argued that directors were just knowledgable individuals who could well read the business
cycle, and therefore sold shares (perhaps in many firms) before a business downturn. The
size of these effects is large. For example, if we consider the first column of results, a one
standard deviation decrease in profit growth is associated with a roughly 70% increase in a
director’s sales. Once we control for firm fixed-effects the magnitude drops to around 50%.
Although these effects are large, they need to be placed in context. Directors of listed firms
only sold 2.1% of the firm’s equity in a given year (see Table I, panel A).
If a director’s surname was found in the firm’s title (which should indicate if the firm was
originally a private firm taken public by the founding family) then that director was found
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to sell less before a profit downgrade, and in some specifications the relation between a drop
in profits and an increase in insider sales is completely overturned. Founding families tended
to be long-term investors and therefore less likely to sell out due to a (temporary) drop in
profitability. Directors were more likely to sell their shares if it was relatively easy to do
so, that is if the market for the firm’s shares was deep and liquid. The positive coeffi cient
on size indicates just this, larger firms tended to have a more liquid market on the stock
exchange, and directors of these firms were more likely to sell their shares just before a
drop in profitability was announced. Firms which were older may also have had a more
liquid market, and we find tentative evidence that this encouraged insider trading. Firms
which held little cash relative to assets tended to see their shares sold before a poor profit
announcement. Presumably these were firms fairly close to getting into financial trouble,
and even one poor year’s trading may have been enough to encourage the directors to sell
out. Of the other controls, there is no clear relation between the proportion of a firm’s shares
owned by a director and his proclivity to sell before an earnings announcement, and there
is only weak evidence that a director with the same surname was less likely (overall) to sell
his shares in the firm.
Offi cially listed firms were quite different to unlisted firms, they tended to be substantially
larger, have a more dispersed shareholding, and of course were subject to stock exchange
regulations that were not present for unlisted firms. Therefore, we repeat the exercise de-
scribed above for unlisted firms. As profitability is only reported at annual frequency, and
since the exact release of this information is typically unknown for unlisted firms due to the
lower amount of media coverage of them, we can only work with annual data for the unlisted
firms. A firm’s full-year profits were generally reported to shareholders at (or just before) the
AGM, and the list of shareholders (with details of shares sold during the year) was legally
required to be filed no later than 14 days after the AGM, therefore the vast majority of
(directors’) sales reported in year t will have occurred before the release of full year profit
figures for year t.
Table III shows that no matter if we define profitability as the percentage change in
profits or the change in ROE, a fall in profitability from year t-1 to year t is related to an
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increase in the sales of directors in year t. The magnitudes of these effects are often lower
for the unlisted firms, probably because there was less of a liquid market for their equity,
and the ease of selling shares was more diffi cult. A firm with a ready market on the London
Stock Exchange provided more opportunities for a director to unload (soon to be worth less)
shares than a provincial or a ‘special settlement’listing or a firm that was traded completely
off-exchange. The economic effect is again quite large, a one standard deviation decrease in
profit growth is associated with a roughly 40% increase in a director’s sales.
The positive coeffi cient on the proportion of a company’s shares owned by a particular
director may indicate a preference for diversification and/or a general unwinding of the link
between firm insiders and ownership in this period (as suggested by Franks, Meyer and Rossi
(2009)). Alternatively, firms with more director ownership may have been more susceptible
to insider trading. A director had (at least) two methods to personally enrich himself through
his position, private contracting with the firm and insider trading. In a firm with a high
level of director ownership private contracting would be less attractive, since the director
would be stealing cash that would have otherwise gone to himself (and other directors) as
dividends. In such a firm insider trading would be more beneficial, since the director would
be enriching himself at the expense of outside shareholders.
Larger firms tended to have more sales performed by directors, again probably due to a
more liquid market. The negative coeffi cient on firm age may denote that directors (often
family members) tended to sell off their holdings early. Once we control for fixed effects
the coeffi cient on size tends to become insignificant, probably because for a particular firm,
firm age and firm size are strongly correlated, making identification diffi cult. Somewhat
surprisingly, we do not find a clear relation between unlisted firms’cash to assets ratio and
insider sales, nor between same surname directors and their sales.
Altogether, the results for both listed and unlisted directors’ sales show quite clearly
that directors were sensitive to the performance of their firms. If the firm was doing poorly
a director was more likely to sell off some of his shares, often before the poor performance
became public knowledge. The sales of directors may only indicate part of the insider trading
problem, since directors may have acted through proxies such as wives, relatives or friends.
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In that case insider trading may show up in asset prices, but not directly in the sales of
shares by directors themselves.
Since ‘bad news’can encompass many eventualities, not just the release of dividend and
profit figures, we now reverse the procedure and ask if a director’s trading can indicate
bad times ahead. In effect we presume that directors’sales do represent insider trading, and
verify if that is consistent with the data. We check if the firm experienced negative abnormal
returns on the stock exchange after a director’s sales of shares. Again, we can only test this
for firms which were offi cially listed.
In Table IV we show the ordinary share price impact associated with a director’s sales of
shares, ordinary and preference classes considered separately. We calculate abnormal returns
as follows:
rj = Rj − (âj + b̂jRm) (1)
where Rj is the actual return of security j from 0 weeks to 2 weeks after the dividend
announcement (and also from 3 to 10 weeks after) and Rm is the actual return on the
market over the same interval. We estimate aj and bj with the market model using weekly
data from 34 weeks before to 1 week before the dividend announcement.
In the fourteen days following the sale of a director’s shares there is no statistical evidence
of an abnormal market reaction, either positive or negative. As a company was forced to
leave its list of shareholders open for the inspection of the public for all but 30 days during
the year, news of these sales was public knowledge (or perhaps more correctly ‘potentially
public knowledge’since someone would have needed to physically visit the company’s offi ce
and inspect the register). We interpret the lack of a market response to indicate that the
sale of shares by a director per se had no impact on the market’s valuation of the company.
However, in the three to ten weeks following the sale of a director’s ordinary shares (during
which time the ‘bad news’presumably became public) the company’s share price fell, with
a negative abnormal return of 2 to 3% on the ordinary shares. Furthermore, if a director
had sold more than 10% of his holdings there was a more negative response on the stock
market. This moderate negative impact on share prices is similar to what Meulbroek (1992)
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finds for negative earnings announcements. She finds that when directors traded (and were
prosecuted for doing so) before earnings downgrades in the U.S. during the 1980s there
was a negative abnormal return of roughly 2% (see her Table V). We find no statistically
significant impact on the price of ordinary shares following a sale of preference shares by
directors. Since preference shares’cash flow rights were usually very secure, their price was
usually very stable unless a firm was close to bankruptcy. A moderate amount of bad news is
going to have much more impact on the price of ordinary shares, and consequently a director
wishing to avoid a negative wealth shock would wish to sell his ordinary shares first. A sale
of ordinary shares is much more likely to indicate troubled times ahead than the sale of
preference shares and explains the insignificant coeffi cient for preference shares.
We now turn to an analysis of insider trading that comes from the purchases of directors.
All firms list the names of shareholders at the end of the bookkeeping year as well as the sales
of shares of current ‘members’and ‘members’who sold all of their shares during the year
in question. The vast majority of firms do not list who purchased these shares.6 Therefore,
the best we can do to study purchasing behaviour is to assess the change in the holdings of
directors from one list to another (usually several years later). An additional concern is that
the change in the number of shares held by a director at the end of the bookkeeping year
may involve many purchases and offsetting sales.
Our method to assess the impact of net purchases follows that of Savor and Lu (2009).
For each firm-year in which we observe a ’Form E’we total the number of ordinary shares
held by all of the directors. From one year to another we observe if that firm’s directors
had increased or decreased their holdings of shares, in aggregate. We define the months in
between as “buy" or “sell" years for insiders.7 For each month between January 1892 and
December 1909 we construct equally weighted portfolios of all “buy" and “sell" firms and
calculate the stock market returns of those portfolios. We then regress the portfolio returns
on the overall market index, and standard risk factors.8 The coeffi cient of interest is the
6A handful of unlisted firms have listed the identities of the purchasers in individual transactions.
7For example, in the 1899 shareholder list for Evered and Co. the directors held 4,744 ordinary shares.
In 1904 they held in total 4,026 shares. Therefore we define the months from January 1900 until December
1904 as “sell" months.
8The risk factors used are the return on the Small less Big Portfolio, the return on the High Book to
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intercept, known as alpha, which measures if returns were (abnormally) higher or lower than
would be expected by the model (see Table V).
We find weak evidence that firms whose directors were (over a multi-year period, on
average) buying shares received a higher return than can be explained by traditional risk
factors. All of the estimates of alpha for the buy portfolio are positive, although only one
specification (and that for purchases of preference shares) is positive. In addition, the return
on portfolios whose directors were (net) sellers of shares was lower than can be explained
by risk factors. Although these results are weak, they support the idea that directors were
buying more shares of their firm if it was doing well, and selling if it was doing poorly. The
necessity of aggregating over multiple directors, multiple trades, and across several years
precludes tests with more statistical power.
For our final analysis we investigate abnormal returns before the public release of in-
formation. If an individual with inside knowledge tended to sell his/her shares before the
announcement of bad news (such as a dividend cut or a drop in profits) then prices will
be affected. In other words, a negative(positive) abnormal return before bad(good) news is
publicly announced is indicative of either an information leak, or trading by insiders (such as
directors) before the announcement (see e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Meulbroek (1992),
and Banjerjee and Eckard (2001)). To test for pre-release price movements we use the market
model.
In Table VI we present the abnormal returns of ordinary shares in the weeks leading up to
a public dividend announcement. To obtain more observations (and thus greater statistical
power) we use data from a previous paper (see Braggion and Moore (2011)) which, while
covering the same period in British history, has comparatively little overlap with the firms
in this sample. The major difference is that there are many more offi cially listed firms, and
lots of these are railway firms.9
We compute the actual return of security j over 4 weeks (from 5 weeks until 1 week
before the dividend announcement) and compare with the return on the market over the
Market less the Low Book to Market Portfolio, and Momentum.
9Railway firms’ shareholder lists appear not to have been retained by The National Archives, which
explains why we do not include them in this paper.
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same interval. We estimate the coeffi cients of the market model using weekly data from 34
weeks before to 1 week before the interval under consideration. There is strong evidence
of negative abnormal returns in the weeks before a dividend reduction or omission and
positive abnormal returns before an increase in the dividend or its commencement. These
abnormal returns indicate that either (i) information ‘leaked’from the company to the stock
market or (ii) some insiders were buying(selling) before a dividend increase(decrease) and this
impacted prices. In the absence of loose-lipped accountants or indiscreet company secretaries
we think the evidence points towards insider dealing by directors or the people they passed
the information on to. The results in Table VI indicate that insider trading was probably
present to a greater or lesser extent throughout British corporate life during this period,
including ‘professionally’run huge companies such as the railways.
IV Conclusion
Company directors in the turn of the 20th century United Kingdom operated in a laissez-
faire environment with almost no formal rules to regulate their behaviour and few measures
for redress available to shareholders. In such an environment insider trading could, and was,
done with impunity. We find evidence that insider trading was profitable for directors.
Directors sold their shares before the release of unfavourable profit releases, and bought
before improvements in earnings. We find evidence of suspicious upwards jumps in the share
price in the weeks before a dividend increase (and drops in the price before dividend cuts or
omissions) which is consistent with insider trading (or at least the spilling of such information
by company offi cials). If a director did sell his shares there was no immediate impact on the
share price, however two to ten weeks in the future the share price did drop by 2 to 3%,
consistent with a director selling a little before bad news was publicly released by the firm.
Finally, over very long horizons (roughly five years) firms whose directors were buying shares
are associated with better stock market performances than for those firms whose directors
were selling their own holdings.
Despite the lack of regulation, and the apparent profitability of insider dealing, what is
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most surprising is the moderate level of it. Directors did trade substantially more in our
sample than current U.K. directors. The total sales of directors in an average listed firm in
the U.K. were roughly 2.1% of the firm by market capitalization (see Table I, panel A) which
is much more than the 0.46% that Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) find for British
firms in the period 1991 to 1998 (see their Table I, panel A). A firm’s directors were also
more likely to sell shares in our sample (they sold 2.65 times per year on average) than the
U.K. firms in Fidrmuc et al’s sample, where directors sold on average 0.69 times per year.
The U.K. has contemporary rules on insider trading that are considerably tougher than
comparable regimes (e.g., the United States, see Fidrmuc et al (2006)). Hence it is not
surprising that there is substantially less trading by directors in the U.K. today than there
was a century ago. However, what is striking is the number of insider trading opportunities
that historical British directors did not exploit. During the 60 days prior to an earnings
announcement there were only 18 instances when a director sold shares (corresponding to
7 firms, which means that multiple directors were selling at the same time in these firms).
In our sample there are 150 director-announcement observations when a firm announced a
decrease in earnings. The fact that in 132(88%) of these occasions directors did not sell any
of their shares in the 60 days preceding the announcement is evidence of broadly ethical
behaviour. Our results mesh with those of Banerjee and Eckard(2001) who find that insiders
did not greatly exploit their unique knowledge in the U.S. market for mergers and acquisitions
during the 1897-1903 merger wave. Roughly three-quarters of price run-ups associated with
a merger occurred after the public announcement of the merger.
As previous authors such as Lavington (1921), Michie (1999), and Chambers and Dimson
(2009) have stressed, the personal nature of shareholding, and the close physical proximity
of directors to shareholders in early 20th century Britain, may have acted to curb the worst
excesses of directors. An alternative, that pilfering money from the company via other
methods was so easy that insider trading was not worthwhile, can not be ruled out though.
16
References
Arnold, Antony, 1995, Should Historians Trust late Nineteenth-Century Company Financial
Statements, Business History, 38(2), 40-54.
Banerjee, Ajeyo and E. Woodrow Eckard, 2001, Why Regulate Insider Trading? Evidence
from the First Great Merger Wave (1897-1903), American Economic Review, 91(5), 1329-
1349.
Bhattacharya, Utpal, and Hazem Daouk, 2002, The World Price of Insider Trading, The
Journal of Finance, 57(1), 75-108.
Braggion, Fabio and Lyndon Moore, 2011, Dividend Policies in an Unregulated Market: The
London Stock Exchange 1895-1905, Review of Financial Studies, 24(9), 2935-2973.
Campbell, Gareth and John Turner, 2011, Substitutes for legal protection: corporate gover-
nance and dividends in Victorian Britain, Economic History Review, 64(2), 571-597.
Capie, Forrest and Mark Billings, 2001, Profitability in English banking in the twentieth
century, European Review of Economic History, Vol. 5(3), 367-401.
Chambers, David and Elroy Dimson, 2009, IPO Underpricing over the Very Long Run, The
Journal of Finance, 64(3), 1407-1443.
Cheffi ns, Brian, 2008, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed,
Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.
Cohen, Lauren, Christopher Malloy, and Lukasz Pomorski, 2012, Decoding Inside Informa-
tion, Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Dimson, Elroy, Paul Marsh, and Mike Staunton, 2002, Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years
of Global Investment Returns, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Fidrmuc, Jana, Marc Goergen, and Luc Renneboog, 2006, Insider Trading, News Releases,
and Ownership Concentration, The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2931-2973.
17
Franks, Julian, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, 2009, Ownership: Evolution and Regulation,
Review of Financial Studies, 22(10), 4009-4056.
Friederich, Sylvain, Alan Gregory, John Matatko, and Ian Tonks, 2002, Short-Run Returns
around the Trades of Corporate Insiders on the London Stock Exchange, European Finan-
cial Management, 8(1), 7-30.
Hannah, Leslie, 1974, Takeover bids in Britain before 1950: An Exercise in Business ‘Pre-
History’, Business History, 16(1), 65-77.
Hannah, Leslie, 2007, The Divorce of Ownership from Control from 1900 Onwards: Re-
calibrating Imagined Global Trends, Business History, 49(4), 404-438.
Jarrell, Gregg and Annette Poulsen,1989, Stock Trading before the Announcement of Tender
Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation?, Journal of Law, Economics and Organi-
zation, 5(2), 225-248.
Kennedy, William, 1987, Industrial structure, capital markets and the origins of British
economic decline, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lavington, Frederick, 1921, The English Capital Market, Methuen, London.
Meulbroek, Lisa, 1992, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, Journal of Finance,
47(5), 1661-1699.
Michie, Ranald, 1999, The London Stock Exchange: A History Oxford University Press,
Oxford and New York.
Petersen, Mitchell, 2009, Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Compar-
ing Approaches, Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480.
Ravina, Enrichetta and Paolo Sapienza, 2009, What Do Independent Directors Know? Evi-
dence from Their Trading, Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 962-1003.
Savor, Pavel, and Qi Lu, Do Stock Mergers Create Value for Acquirers?, Journal of Finance,
Vol. 64(3), pp. 1061-1097, 2009.
18
Mean Median s.d. N
Profits (profits in thousands of pounds) 47.462 30.255 53.220 62
Return on Assets, ROA (%) 0.062 0.060 0.036 62
Return on Equity, ROE (%) 0.105 0.091 0.067 62
ΔProfits (%) 0.058 0.043 0.540 49
ΔROA -0.015 -0.001 0.068 48
ΔROE -0.011 0.000 0.031 47
Shares held by directors (% of total) 14.100 5.000 36.200 46
Firm Size (assets in thousands of pounds) 1049 431 1495 62
Firm Age (years) 11.070 7.000 9.707 62
Number of Directors 4.565 5 2.460 62
# shares sold by directors / # issued shares 0.021 0 0.071 46
Number of trades 2.650 1 4.528 60
Cash / Assets 0.120 0.087 0.146 62
Profits (profits in thousands of pounds) 10.465 6.202 14141 142
Return on Assets, ROA (%) 0.053 0.049 0.0753 142
Return on Equity, ROE (%) 0.085 0.078 0.116 137
ΔProfits (%) -0.051 0.000 6.01 104
ΔROA 0.003 0.000 0.0912 102
ΔROE 0.009 0.001 0.141 99
Ordinary and pref. shares held by directors (% of total) 31.900 14.400 38.3 102
Firm Size (assets in thousands of pounds) 218.1 168.6 203.6 148
Firm Age (years) 9.507 7.500 8.224 148
Number of Directors 4.595 5 1.266 148
# shares sold by directors / # issued shares 0.016 0 0.0608 102
Number of trades 1.000 0 2.315 148
Cash / Assets 0.053 0.028 0.0708 144
Director's surname appears in firm's name 0.127 0 0.334 283
# director's shares held / # issued shares 0.026 0.007 0.064 222
# director's shares sold 183 0 971 283
# director's shares sold / # director's shares at start of year 0.045 0 0.177 222
# director's shares sold / # issued shares 0.003 0 0.011 222
Director's surname appears in firm's name 0.143 0 0 680
# director's shares held / # issued shares 0.070 0.023 0.143 435
# director's shares sold 87 0 780 680
# director's shares sold / # director's shares at start of year 0.010 0 0 417
# director's shares sold / # issued shares 0.002 0 0.0105 511
Panel D : Director Characteristics, Not Officially Listed
Table I
Summary Statistics
In Panel A we present descriptive statistics of the firms officially listed on the London Stock Exchange in our
sample. In Panel B we present descriptive statistics for firms which were not officially listed in London. Each
observation is a firm-year for which we possess data on the trades of directors. In Panels C and D we present
data on directors for listed and unlisted firms repectively. Each observation is a director-year (there are no
directors which serve in 2 or more firms in our sample). "Shares" includes both ordinary and preference
shares.
Panel A : Firm Characteristics, Officially Listed
Panel C : Director Characteristics, Officially Listed
Panel B : Firm Characteristics, Not Officially Listed
Dep Variable # # # # prop. prop. prop. prop.
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
% ΔProfits -0.477** -0.354*** -0.072*** -0.022***
(0.179) (0.031) (0.025) (0.003)
Same name *(%ΔProfits) 0.332 0.166 0.081* -0.008
(0.200) (0.156) (0.042) (0.007)
ΔROE -1.449*** -2.552*** 0.044 -0.257***
(0.404) (0.174) (0.097) (0.011)
Same name *(Δ ROE) 3.213*** 2.873*** 0.185** 0.126***
(0.333) (0.314) (0.072) (0.011)
Director's prop. 0.513 0.322 0.334 0.366 -0.006 -0.013 -0.042 -0.008
(0.414) (0.412) (0.340) (0.433) (0.037) (0.020) (0.056) (0.019)
ln (Size) 0.380*** -0.350** 0.363** 0.103 0.038*** 0.096*** 0.040* 0.125***
(0.126) (0.158) (0.166) (0.068) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012)
ln (1+Age) 0.100 0.281* 0.102 -0.013 0.011 0.017** 0.009 -0.008
(0.102) (0.141) (0.113) (0.147) (0.016) (0.008) (0.021) (0.010)
Cash / Assets -1.749** -1.516*** -1.555** 2.373*** -0.080 0.073 -0.091 0.696***
(0.632) (0.429) (0.677) (0.222) (0.075) (0.049) (0.097) (0.072)
Same name -0.085 -0.143* 0.027 0.008 -0.025 -0.008 -0.017 -0.001
(0.091) (0.077) (0.091) (0.048) (0.015) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004)
Constant -4.815** 4.836** -4.934* -1.188 -0.504** -1.296*** -0.574* -1.738***
(1.765) (2.001) (2.466) (0.710) (0.184) (0.249) (0.317) (0.191)
R2 0.100 0.020 0.092 0.028 0.097 0.015 0.068 0.017
N 348 348 333 333 348 348 333 333
Table II
Determinants of a Director's Sales just before an Earnings Announcement, Officially Listed Firms
We regress the natural logarithm of one plus the number of shares sold (#) and the proportion of a director's
holdings (prop.) that he sold in the 60 days before an earnings announcement in year t on the percentage change in
profits (% ΔProfits) and the percentage change in the return on equity (% ΔROE) from year t-1 to year t. We
condition on other firm characteristics (as defined in Table I). Same name is a dummy variable equal to one if at
least one director's surname was included in the company's title. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
was officially listed on the London Stock Exchange. Some regressions use firm fixed effects. All regressions use
year fixed effects. *, **, and *** represent coefficients that are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, standard errors are clustered at the firm level and they appear in parentheses under the coefficient.
Dep Variable # # # # prop. prop. prop. prop.
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
% ΔProfits -0.301*** -0.106 -0.009** -0.008
(0.100) (0.156) (0.004) (0.005)
Same name *(%ΔProfits) -0.058 0.395 -0.004 0.009
(0.349) (0.724) (0.011) (0.009)
ΔROE -1.515 -3.867*** -0.064*** -0.180***
(0.935) (0.678) (0.022) (0.029)
Same name *(Δ ROE) 0.649 9.119 -0.033 0.203
(7.191) (10.142) (0.152) (0.179)
Director's prop. 3.072* 2.906 3.381* 3.024 0.000 0.010 0.007 0.011
(1.635) (1.955) (1.743) (2.001) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.029)
ln (Size) 0.259** -0.101 0.185 -0.489* 0.011** 0.021 0.006 0.004
(0.118) (0.373) (0.116) (0.260) (0.005) (0.019) (0.004) (0.013)
ln (1+Age) -0.162 -1.295** -0.145 -1.366*** -0.004 0.016 -0.001 0.007
(0.146) (0.509) (0.119) (0.442) (0.006) (0.020) (0.005) (0.019)
Cash / Assets 0.154 -5.006 0.136 -4.564 0.012 -0.067 0.027 -0.065
(1.541) (5.049) (1.606) (5.690) (0.053) (0.146) (0.054) (0.123)
Same name 0.054 0.383 0.112 0.450 -0.008 0.003 -0.006 0.004
(0.352) (0.417) (0.361) (0.434) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Constant -2.148 5.614 -1.356 9.999** -0.080 -0.261 -0.040 -0.023
(1.329) (5.469) (1.331) (3.900) (0.050) (0.266) (0.041) (0.188)
R2 0.126 0.056 0.125 0.071 0.040 0.019 0.048 0.028
N 619 619 589 589 610 610 580 580
Table III
Determinants of a Director's Sales, Unlisted Firms
We regress the natural logarithm of one plus the number of shares sold (#) and the proportion of a director's
holdings (prop.) that he sold in year t on the percentage change in profits (% ΔProfits) and the percentage change in
the return on equity (% ΔROE) from year t-1 to year t. We condition on other firm characteristics (as defined in
Table I). Same name is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one director's surname was included in the
company's title. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was officially listed on the London Stock
Exchange. Some regressions use firm fixed effects. All regressions use year fixed effects. *, **, and *** represent
coefficients that are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and they appear in parentheses under the coefficient.
Weeks ordinary preference ord. or pref. ordinary preference ord. or pref.
Abnormal Return -0.001 0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.003
Standard Error (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 98 42 140 81 46 35
Abnormal Return -0.021* 0.012 -0.011 -0.033** 0.010 -0.015
Standard Error (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013)
Observations 99 42 141 46 35 81
ordinary preference ord. or pref. ordinary preference ord. or pref.
Abnormal Return -0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
Standard Error (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Observations 102 44 146 50 37 87
Abnormal Return -0.014 -0.011 -0.013 -0.023** -0.015 -0.020*
Standard Error (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
Observations 103 46 149 50 39 89
3‐10
We calculate the abnormal return of a firm from 0 to 2 weeks a director sold any/at least 10% of his shares, and repeat the 
calculation of abnormal returns from 3 weeks to 10 weeks after a sale. The coefficients α and β are estimated from the 
market model in panel A, and set equal to zero and one in panel B. We split results between sales of ordinary shares, sales of 
preference shares, and sales of either type. We report standard errors and the number of observations of directors selling 
shares. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level.
All Sales Director sold more than 10% of his shares
Panel B: α=0 and β=1.
Any Sales Director sold more than 10% of his shares
Panel A: α and β estimated from market model
Table IV





Share Type Ordinary Ordinary Preference Preference Ordinary Ordinary Preference Preference
Weighted Least Squares No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Alpha 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Returns 0.264*** 0.271*** 0.135** 0.138** 0.277*** 0.270*** 0.047 0.072
(0.082) (0.081) (0.053) (0.066) (0.080) (0.086) (0.178) (0.144)
Small minus Large Size -0.162 -0.170* -0.057 -0.053 -0.144 -0.131 0.092 0.059
(0.105) (0.098) (0.082) (0.079) (0.104) (0.109) (0.213) (0.177)
High minus Low Book to Market 0.162* 0.173** 0.138** 0.138** 0.182* 0.166* 0.205 0.218
(0.092) (0.084) (0.055) (0.068) (0.104) (0.097) (0.187) (0.148)
Momentum -0.094 -0.108** -0.033 -0.035 0.012 0.019 -0.069 -0.070
(0.060) (0.052) (0.042) (0.042) (0.057) (0.058) (0.086) (0.091)
R2 0.081 0.089 0.041 0.045 0.079 0.079 0.039 0.038
N 168 168 168 168 145 145 132 132
Table V
Long-run returns to Directors' Sales
We form portfolios of companies for which directors were net buyers, the "buy" portfolio, and sellers of their shares, the "sell" portfolio. We 
calculate the monthly returns of these portolios, equally weighted. We regress portfolio returns on the market index, the return on the (small 
size - large size) portfolio, the return on the (high book to market - low book to market) portfolio and momentum. We report standard errors 
underneath the coefficients. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Buy Portfolio Sell Portfolio
Cuts & Omissions Increases & 
Commencements
Cuts > 10% & 
Omissions
Increases > 10% & 
Commencements
Abnormal Return -0.006* 0.005* -0.006* 0.006**
Standard Error (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 305 414 255 348
Abnormal Return -0.010*** 0.007*** -0.011*** 0.009***
Standard Error (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 311 425 261 358
Table VI
Abnormal Returns before a dividend announcementy y
before an announcement (a 4 week duration). The coefficients α and β are estimated from the market model in 
panel A, and set equal to zero and one in panel B. We report standard errors and the number of observations. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level.
Panel A: α and β estimated from market model
Panel B: α=0 and β=1.
